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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Time is not costless in the context of global warming legislation, and so 
the longer it takes society to address global warming, the harder it will be to 
do so.1  Nevertheless, in 2010 Richard J. Lazarus, a professor at Harvard Law 
School, declared that “political pundits of every stripe are writing climate 
change legislation’s obituary.”2  The United States has already fallen behind 
other established democracies in the European Union in addressing this 
issue.3  Climate change is an important problem that affects both our natural 
resources and water supply,4 so why has it been so difficult to address? 
Section II of this Article explores some basics of climate change 
legislation, in order to establish a foundation.  Section III examines some of 
the most important federal and state climate change laws.  Section IV 
discusses litigation as a potential alternative to addressing climate change 
through state and federal legislation.  Section V explores several major 
problems associated with climate change, and Section VI proposes solutions 
for each.  Section VII provides several recommendations for drafting lasting, 
effective climate change and for the substance of said legislation.  The scope 
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of this Article is intentionally broad in order to address climate change 
legislation holistically. 
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION 
Climate change legislation generally falls into two broad categories: 
mitigation and adaptation.5  Mitigation legislation seeks to reduce the 
emission of greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change.6  Mitigation 
strategies primarily affect transportation and electric industries, but may 
affect others as well, including manufacturing.7 Adaptation legislation 
responds to the effects of climate change in order to ensure the continued 
viability of human and animal life, in case efforts to mitigate climate change 
are unsuccessful.8 
David L. Markell, a professor at Florida State University College of 
Law, notes that any new climate legislation must include efforts to preserve 
life for humans and animals in the face of climate change.9  Addressing this 
problem, however, requires asking certain normative questions: which 
components of climate change should be addressed, and how?10  Any remedy 
would be at least partially inadequate, because climate change affects the 
world in ways that humans cannot completely mitigate.11  Robin Craig, a 
professor at S.J. Quinney College of Law, hypothesized that climate change’s 
impact on the globe has already gone too far for humans to control much of 
the environment’s reactions; therefore, passing adaptation legislation has 
increased in importance.12  How to implement adaptation climate change 
legislation will perhaps become more clear, through the process of trial and 
error, once more legislation is passed containing both adaptation and 
mitigation strategies.  It is also possible that environmentalists in Congress 
could use different approaches to address this problem as “bargaining chips” 
in the negotiation phase of legislation.  The private sector might be reluctant 
to pass certain types of remedies for climate change, but more willing to pass 
others.13  Whatever the future of climate change legislation, those who draft 
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climate change legislation should consider potential alternatives when 
addressing the causes and effects of climate change. 
III. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS 
Both the federal government and state governments have enacted 
climate change legislation.  Climate change legislation is unique because the 
most significant changes happen from the “bottom up,” since state legislation 
can spur change at the federal level.14  However, state action alone is unlikely 
to sufficiently address problems with climate change.15 
A.  Federal Legislative Efforts  
 Climate change law is a rapidly changing field, and only recently has 
the United States Congress enacted legislation to abate it.16  One of the oldest 
debates in climate change legislation deals with whether a federal regulatory 
“floor” is necessary.17  There are two reasons generally proffered for why a 
federal floor might be needed.18  First, allowing each state to decide whether 
to set their own standards could create a national “race to the bottom,” which 
would provide standards for greenhouse gas emissions far below those of 
other countries.19  Second, the migration of pollution from one state to 
another might provide motivation for the government to address climate 
change nationally, as this problem is unlikely to be solved on the state level 
alone.20  Though these two theories help explain why there is a national push 
for climate change legislation, this is only part of the debate.  As discussed 
below, regulation at the state level is unlikely to cover a large enough area to 
make a significant difference in the levels of emissions, and there is not a 
sufficient mechanism to enact regulatory environmental change at the 
international level.  Therefore, since federal climate change legislation is 
likely the best available option for climate change activists, it is helpful to 
review previous federal legislation. 
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 The 1970s saw a wave of wide-ranging pollution control legislation.21 
For example, in 1975, the Department of Transportation set standards for 
automobile emissions, in accordance with the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act.22  In 2007, the Energy Independence and Security Act 
significantly changed the standards for automobile emissions.23  Under these 
standards, both passenger automobiles and light trucks manufactured in the 
United States must achieve an average of thirty-five miles per gallon.24 
 The National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987 established 
efficiency standards for appliances and other equipment and gave the 
Department of Energy the authority to set new standards for energy 
compliance for several consumer products.25  These standards reduced fossil 
fuel emissions by 1.7% in 2000, and could triple those benefits by 2020.26 
 In 1992, about half of the states adopted the most current regulations, 
concerning emissions from buildings, under the Energy Policy Act, making 
buildings more energy efficient.27  Because 40% of greenhouse gas emissions 
come from buildings, the regulations greatly reduced the amount of 
greenhouse gas emissions.28 
 Similarly, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 greatly increased the amount 
of biofuels and renewable resources imported into the United States.29  The 
Energy Independence and Security Act was signed into law in 2007 and was 
intended to improve energy efficiency in lighting, appliances, and 
buildings.30  Title IV of the Act required that by 2015, federal buildings 
reduce total energy use by 30%.31 
 Although a renewed push for national climate legislation is underway, 
many past attempts at the federal level to pass new regulations to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions have failed.32  While most of the proposed bills 
would have provided short-term change, only a handful would have created 
lasting environmental benefits.33 
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B.  State Legislative Efforts 
 Most of the current efforts to combat climate change are occurring at 
the state level.34  California has emerged as the leader in legislative efforts to 
combat climate change.35 Recently, the California legislature passed a bill 
that seeks to reduce emissions by 25% by 2020, creating new standards for 
several large local industries.36  California’s efforts to reduce emissions by 
motor vehicles is one of the most significant efforts in the nation, as it 
endeavors to reduce emissions from light-duty cars by 18% in 2020 and by 
27% in 2030.37  Ten states have committed to adopting California’s standards 
once they become effective.38 
 Several northeastern states have also adopted a cap-and-trade 
program.39  Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, and Vermont have implemented legislation to cap emissions at 
their 2009 level and to reduce emissions by 10% in 2019.40  Both Oregon and 
Washington have adopted emissions caps for new power plants, though 
plants need only comply with some of the program’s requirements in order 
to be certified.41  New Hampshire and Massachusetts have emissions caps for 
existing plants, with current offsets and carbon trading available in the 
future.42 
Several states take less conventional approaches.  Twenty-two states 
now require that a certain percent of energy revenue come from qualifying 
renewable energy, contributing to energy diversity in those states.43  The 
percentage required for compliance, however, varies significantly from state 
to state.44  Additionally, at least seventeen states have established plans to 
stabilize greenhouse gas emission levels at 2010 levels by 2020.45  Several 
states have also filed litigation to reduce emissions.46  Several northeastern 
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states, that are leaders of state climate change initiatives, have adopted the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiatives (“RGGI”).47  These states have agreed 
upon a regional limit for fossil-fuel-fired energy generation.48  The overall 
cap is modest, and there is a phase-in period.49 
 While states have made a great deal of headway in passing climate 
change legislation, more action is needed.  Again, state action alone is 
unlikely to sufficiently address problems with climate change.50  Since the 
United States has chosen not to participate in the Kyoto Protocol,51 more 
activists are looking to the federal level for implementing new legislation.52 
As both state and federal legislation can be inefficient in accomplishing 
the goals of climate change legislation, advocates should consider other 
avenues for instituting change.  One of those avenues is litigation. 
IV.  LITIGATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO LEGISLATION 
In some instances, federal legislation either moves too slowly or is not 
very effective.  This section explores two cases effecting climate change (one 
at the national level and one at the supranational level) and concludes that, to 
an extent, litigation can be a valid alternative to climate change legislation.53  
Although neither of the cases discussed herein utilized the doctrine of public 
nuisance, some courts have used this doctrine to combat climate change.   
Massachusetts v. EPA involved twelve states as petitioners.54  The 
petitioners asked the court to determine “whether the EPA has the statutory 
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles, 
and, if so, whether its stated reasons for refusing to do so [were] consistent 
with the statute.”55  The United States Supreme Court held that the Clean Air 
Act (Air Pollution Control Act)56 provided the EPA with authority to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions, and that the EPA could not refuse to enforce such 
standards.57  The Court held that “[t]he harms associated with climate change 
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are serious and well recognized”58 and cited a rise in global sea levels as 
evidence of the harms.59  This case is one example where litigation has 
produced a significant difference in federal climate change law by mandating 
that the EPA regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. 
One interesting example of climate change litigation was filed by the 
Inuit Circumpolar Conference (“ICC”), which represents Inuits living in the 
Arctic, against the United States.60  The ICC cuts though several national 
borders, including the United States, Russia, Greenland, and Canada.61  The 
petition was filed before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(“the Commission”), a regional, national organization.  The petition claimed 
that greenhouse gas emissions violated rights articulated in the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.62  As such, the Commission 
applied supranational human rights law, relying in part upon other 
supranational law.63 
The reason this litigation is worth consideration is because it takes place 
on an international level.  In the international context, successful litigation 
could produce results on a larger scale than legislation, which cannot exceed 
national boundaries.64  Of course, transnational litigation produces many 
potential problems.  Even if corporate greenhouse gas emissions are illegal 
internationally, no global governing body exists to enforce new standards.65 
The very existence of authority that regulates corporations emanates from the 
authority of individual countries.66 
Though the Inuits’ petition was later rejected, there are several 
important lessons to be learned from the suit.67  The petitioners in that case 
knew they did not have the necessary enforcement mechanism to make the 
United States reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, though they did hope 
to bring widespread attention to their cause.  Even though one country’s 
pollution might affect humanity on a global level, no bodies exist on the 
supranational level to force countries to comply.  Obviously, in the event that 
any sort of international governing body (or international organization that 
has a mechanism to enforce legislation) develops, litigation would be a way 
to enforce the greatest amount of change quickly.   Such an organization does 
not appear likely in the near future.  Although no enforcement mechanism 
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exists at the supranational level, however, the Massachusetts v. EPA case 
illustrates that significant, lasting change at the federal level can be 
implemented through litigation. 
Considering legislation and litigation separately would likely leave a 
discussion of climate change incomplete.  A more holistic approach to 
climate change involves cooperative federalism. 
V.  COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
Some have advocated for a cooperative approach between states and 
the federal government in dealing with climate change, claiming that state 
and federal legislation can complement each other.68  A criticism of this 
approach is that it is difficult for the affected industry to comply, thereby 
passing additional costs onto the consumer.69  This problem could likely be 
solved by “modified federalism,” in which only two standards are created.70 
Though it would be mandatory for all states to comply with the federal 
climate change regulations, each state could choose whether to adopt a 
second, more stringent set of regulations (also called “floor preemption”).71 
Therefore, any affected industry would only have two or three sets of 
regulations to choose from, rather than fifty.   
In the past, other major federal regulations, such as the Clean Air Act, 
have utilized the “modified federalism approach.”72  Congress allowed some 
states to waive compliance with a stricter standard, while still complying with 
the underlying federal regulation.73  California hoped to establish cooperative 
federalism to pass stricter state legislation, in order to bypass the federal 
legislative process.74  The text of the Clean Air Act provided that the 
Administrator of the EPA was required to deny California the waiver only if 
the Administrator found that: (1) California’s determination that its 
regulations were at least as stringent as federal regulation was not arbitrary 
and capricious, (2) California did not need separate standards to meet 
“compelling and extraordinary reasons” and (3) California’s standards for 
vehicle emissions were inconsistent with federal standards.75 In 1977, 
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Congress allowed other states to choose whether to comply with California’s 
standards instead of the national standards.76 
Not all attempts at cooperative federalism have been successful.  On 
July 22, 2002, former California Governor Grey Davis signed the Pavely Bill 
into law, which would have allowed the California Air Resource Board to 
regulate vehicle emissions.77  In Massachusetts v. EPA, however, the Supreme 
Court determined that the authority to regulate automobile emissions rested 
within the sole purview of the EPA.78  At the end of 2007, the EPA denied 
California’s exemption from the Clean Air Act for the Pavely Bill, noting that 
greenhouse gas emissions were a “global problem” and therefore any remedy 
should only be addressed at the federal level.79 
In 2009, the Administrator of the EPA issued its Endangerment Finding, 
stating that greenhouse gases endangered the public’s health.80  Although the 
finding itself did not impose any new regulations on industries, issuing the 
finding was a prerequisite for implementing additional emissions regulations 
for vehicles.81 
In 2013, the EPA issued an initiative to develop regulations to control 
carbon dioxide emissions from power plants.82  The EPA derives its authority 
to impose these standards under section 111(b) of the Clean Air Act for the 
federal government and under section 111(d) for state governments.83  Under 
this proposal the nation will “continue to rely on a diverse mix of energy 
sources, including efficient natural gas, clean coal technology, nuclear power, 
and renewable energy like wind and solar.”84  The standards imposed for 
existing power plants are expected to be less stringent than the standards for 
new plants.85 
Even though cooperative federalism might be an interesting alternative 
for advocates of climate change legislation, it is likely dead for the time 
being.  Because Massachusetts v. EPA likely precludes delegation of 
environmental regulation to state agencies, it appears that the best option for 
lasting regulation is at the federal level.  However, there are many obstacles 
that need to be overcome to enact any major federal legislation and climate 
change is no exception. 
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VI.  PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
LEGISLATION 
As mentioned earlier, time is not costless in the context of global 
warming,86 and the time-sensitive nature of climate change requires that its 
proponents be proactive.87  In order to make up for lost time, future 
technological advances must achieve exponentially greater reductions than 
what we are currently achieving.88  In other words, the longer we put off the 
problem, the harder it will be to fix. 
The time-sensitivity problem is exacerbated by the fact that our 
legislative system was intentionally designed for lawmaking to take place 
slowly and deliberately.89 Our lawmaking system is also built upon 
bargaining and compromise, which is not always the best option for climate 
change legislation advocates.90  The complex and widespread distribution of 
greenhouse gas emissions also undermines the likelihood of a powerful 
political coalition pushing through meaningful legislation, and those in 
opposition of additional legislation would likely be well-funded.91  Those 
drafting climate change legislation must be creative in order to create 
solutions to these complex problems. 
It has been argued that delay in the context of climate change legislation 
is cheaper in the long-term, because in the interim, technology has the 
potential to make significant headway and greatly reduce costs.92 
Furthermore, wouldn’t it be possible for increases in technology to 
completely solve any future Malthusian crises that might arise, climate 
change included?  Because of the absence of market signals to indicate the 
development of climate change technology in the distant future, the outcome 
of this argument is uncertain.93  Obviously, it is foolhardy to simply do 
nothing about climate change in the hopes of it solving itself in the future 
because of the potential catastrophic consequences if we are wrong. 
A second major problem in passing climate change legislation is that 
the actors who can most easily address climate change are not only the ones 
who contributed the most to the problem, but are also the ones who have the 
least incentive to address it.94  Major polluters have little profit motivation, 
without government intervention, to make any headway dealing with climate 
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change.95  Even on a global scale, many powerful nations choose not to 
address climate change in order to stay economically competitive.96 
Additionally, even though some parts of the world will quickly suffer 
dramatic consequences, other parts of the world will suffer few short-term 
consequences.97  This reduces the incentives for the unaffected parts of the 
world to act even further.98  A third problem appears to be no existing 
governmental framework to address a problem with such a large temporal 
and spatial scope.99   
The easiest answer to these problems lies in advocating for climate 
change regulation on the federal level.  First, passage on the federal level 
would allow for a new “floor,” so states would not have to worry about losing 
business to other states by passing new regulations.100  Although the federal 
government could also pass a “ceiling,” which might be the preferred option 
for corporations, some environmentalists oppose passing ceilings because it 
would preempt the passage of additional state regulations.101  Second, the 
drafters of the legislation could include emission-trading programs in order 
to make the legislation more palatable for businesses.102  The importance of 
forming well-organized interest groups must also be stressed.103  If climate 
change activists wish to impact the legislative process, it is imperative that 
they pool their resources together in order to match the private sector’s 
influence.104 
It is also possible that the private sector might push for climate change 
regulation at the federal level if it has enough incentive because in some 
instances regulation at the state level has prompted action at the federal level. 
The U.S. Climate Action Partnership, a co-operative group of businesses and 
environmental organizations, has stated: “We believe local, state, regional 
and federal programs can and must be complementary.  The aim is to achieve 
compatibility and avoid conflicts between local, state and federal programs 
that unnecessarily drive up compliance costs and make achieving our 
nation’s environmental goals more difficult.”105   
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One way to provide an incentive for industry is to only regulate 
products, instead of “end-of-pipe” pollution, at the state level.106  End-of pipe 
pollution consists of “[m]ethods used to remove already formed 
contaminants from a stream of air, water, waste, product or similar 
[channels].  These techniques are called ‘end-of-pipe’ as they are normally 
implemented as a last stage of a process before the stream is disposed of or 
delivered.”107  The private sector is more likely to push back against product 
regulations because product regulation could effectively push a business out 
of an entire market.108  End-of-pipe pollution regulation allows an affected 
industry considerably more leeway.109  As such, states increase the chance 
that the private sector will appeal to the federal government when they 
engage in product regulation.110 
If many states began passing inconsistent regulations, this might also 
create enough legislative uncertainty for a corporate push for climate change 
legislation as a defensive mechanism.111  This has happened at least three 
times so far.  When Congress passed the Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Act 
of 1965, at least in part due to industry concerns, the private sector helped 
push for the passage of the Air Quality Act of 1967 to preempt new state 
legislation.112  The private sector acted in a similar way regarding the acid 
rain provisions in the Clean Air Act.113  Industry sees scenarios such as these 
as a means to pass a federal regulatory ceiling in order to “pick off” states 
with the highest amount of regulation and preempt other states from enacting 
similar legislation.114  Indeed, climate change advocates often are leery of the 
legislation advocated by various industries because even when an industry is 
advocating for additional legislation, it is still serving its own interests.115 
One interesting problem in climate change legislation involves 
protecting the impoverished from higher utility and product costs.116 
Increased environmental regulations are likely to drive up the cost of some 
types of goods,117 which in turn might drive some Americans deeper into 
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poverty.118  The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities devised a two-
pronged system to address this problem.119  The first prong involves giving a 
“climate-change rebate” to low-income households through the already-
existing general electronic benefit transfer120 (“E.B.T.”) system, in 
combination with tax relief through the Earned Income Tax Credit.121  Under 
the second prong, low-income Americans would have their income 
supplemented by an increase in the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance 
Program.122  It remains to be seen whether such a program would be effective, 
but climate change advocates must be cognizant of how additional legislation 
affects the impoverished. 
Although many obstacles in the path of climate change legislation may 
seem difficult to overcome, it is important to remember that sometimes an 
obstacle can be transformed into a catalyst for change.  Understanding the 
unique problems that climate change legislation faces can prepare educated 
citizens to address such problems during the legislative process. 
VII.  THE FUTURE FOR FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
LEGISLATION 
 Proponents of state legislation proffer several arguments regarding the 
need for state legislation in addition to federal legislation.  First, individual 
states, rather than the federal government, are more likely to address their 
unique concerns.123  Furthermore, the United States government has not been 
proactive in drafting new climate change legislation.124  Finally, the United 
States Congress generally uses state legislation as a measuring post, 
expanding on plans that states already enacted.   
The need for federal climate change legislation, as opposed to state 
legislation, can hardly be called into question.  State legislation is generally 
unable to address problems at the national level.125  State legislation creates 
the problem of “free riders,” where states seek to benefit from the increased 
environmental protection offered in other states, without spending any of the 
associated costs.126  Some states also likely have different “costs” associated 
with different problems, and thus legislate in some areas but not others.127 
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Additionally, many types of pollution that affect climate change are not 
within the boundaries of any one state.128 For example, a river might run 
through many states, and all states share the same air. 
Aside from the aforementioned problems, there are other reasons why 
regulation on the federal level would be more economical.  Federal 
legislation would force states to consider interests outside of their own 
jurisdiction.129  It is also more efficient for the federal government to spend 
money on technology and research, instead of several states spending the 
resources to do the same thing.130  Furthermore, the federal government has 
more resources to spend on technology and research than individual states.131 
Finally, if the federal government adopted a cap-and-trade program, a larger 
market would lower costs and allow for more market fluidity.132 
Perhaps the reason that climate change legislation has been more 
difficult to pass recently is that the American public remains skeptical.  
Justice Scalia no doubt captured many Americans’ feelings on the subject 
when he said that he was “not a scientist” and further stated, “that’s why I 
don't want to have to deal with global warming, to tell you the truth.”133 
Public opinion on climate change legislation might be difficult to sway 
because most climate change legislation asks for increasing short-term cost 
in exchange for long-term benefits, many of which are difficult to measure.134 
Dealing with climate change legislation is a daunting task, and one that 
requires a great deal of time and energy.  Of course, this is not the first time 
that many assumed future climate change legislation in the United States has 
a bleak outlook.135  Indeed, the legislative “moment” that spurred Barack 
Obama’s election to presidency may foreshadow things to come, in terms of 
federal climate change legislation.  President Obama has renewed talks to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, as he made it a large part of his campaign 
for reelection.136  He also appointed a “Climate Czar” to address the matter 
and issued a memorandum to the EPA, directing the agency to revisit past 
decisions on climate change.137 
One of the most important problems facing climate change legislation 
is that, even should sweeping legislation pass, the political climate is so 
volatile that it is possible that significant pieces of any legislation could be 
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repealed.138 Even apart from inevitable ideological swings in our 
congressional makeup, many members of Congress could see climate change 
legislation as an easy target in times of budgetary crisis.139 Should any 
amount of significant climate change reform from Congress come to fruition 
in the near future, environmentalists should consider which strategies to 
employ in order to ensure that any new legislation would be lasting.140 
Perhaps the key to lasting climate change legislation is drafting statutes 
to be flexible, because flexibility would necessarily allow the law to change 
with evolving environmental standards.141  Flexibility is necessary because 
of climate change’s “temporal and spatial reach”; however, the legislation 
must also be steadfast enough to be maintained over the long term.142  Robin 
Kundis Craig, a Professor of Law at Florida State University College of Law, 
claims that flexibility alone in drafting legislation is not enough to ensure that 
the proponents of environmental legislation maintain versatile legislation, 
but that environmentalists must adopt a “principled flexibility.”143  This 
would mean that  
both the law and the regulators (1) distinguish in legally significant ways 
uncontrollable climate change impacts from controllable anthropogenic 
impacts on species, resources, and ecosystems that can and should be 
actively managed and regulated, and (2) implement consistent principles for 
an overall climate change adaptation strategy, even though the application 
of those principles in particular locations in response to specific climate 
change impacts will necessarily encompass a broad and creative range of 
adaptation decisions and actions.144 
A “precommitment strategy” is one employed to take a decision away from 
oneself in the future.145  Lasting climate change legislation should include 
precommitment strategies, which would make it very difficult (but never 
impossible) to change the legislation in response to certain kinds of 
concerns.146 Furthermore, the legislation should contain other 
precommitment strategies that make it easier to change to the law in response 
to longer-term concerns, thus ensuring the legislation’s viability.147  Another 
option would be to include strong financial incentives for businesses to 
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support the legislation (such as an emissions trading program), which would 
make it less likely that the private sector would seek changes in the law.148  It 
is also likely that any sweeping climate change legislation would need to 
include programs which would alleviate the potentially serious adverse 
economic effects of implementing sweeping environmental reform, in order 
to ensure both the passage of the bill and our country’s continued economic 
livelihood.149  Another potential strategy would be to engage in clever 
drafting techniques to insulate climate change legislation from potentially 
fatal unpopular earmarks.150 
The United States Senate Committee on Environment and Public 
Works, headed by Barbara Boxer, released its own guidelines for passing 
climate change legislation in 2009, some of which mirror the 
recommendations discussed above by legal scholars.  These “principles” 
recommended to reduce emissions to levels guided by science to avoid 
climate change,151 set short and long term emissions targets that are certain 
and enforceable, with periodic review of the climate science and adjustments 
to targets and policies as necessary to meet emissions reduction targets,152 
ensure that state and local entities continue pioneering efforts to address 
global warming,153 establish a transparent and accountable market-based 
system that efficiently reduces carbon emissions,154 and use revenues from 
the carbon market in order to accomplish various objectives, such as keeping 
consumers.155  Furthermore, as the United States shifts to using additional 
green energy, we should invest in clean energy technology and measures to 
produce efficient energy, assist states and local areas to adopt ways to 
sufficiently address global warming, take economic measures to assist 
businesses in transitioning to green energy, conserve wildlife threatened by 
climate change, and work with the international community in order to ensure 
that other countries also develop lasting efforts to combat climate change.156 
Finally, the United States should provide intentional incentives so that other 
countries will contribute to the fight against climate change.157 
The Natural Resource Defense Council, a large environmental activist 
group, has called for similar initiatives for climate change legislation by: 
promoting investment in energy efficiency and green energy, setting a cap on 
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greenhouse gas emissions, building on existing climate change legislation at 
the federal and state levels, and supporting international efforts to curb 
climate change.158 
The White House’s website offers an additional set of goals for enacting 
global warming legislation.159 The first goal is to develop and secure 
America’s energy resources by producing safe domestic gas and oil and by 
increasing America’s energy independence.160 Second, America should 
provide consumers with choices to reduce costs and save energy, by ensuring 
that the United States produces more efficient cars, trucks, homes, buildings, 
and factories.161 Finally, legislation should ensure that we are able to continue 
to support developing new technology.162 
Even if environmentalists are unable to pass climate change legislation 
in the near future, it is likely that eventually America will experience another 
legislative “moment” in which to pass additional greenhouse gas emissions 
regulations. When that time comes, environmentalists need a strategy to 
make sure the regulations will be lasting and effective.  In order to do this, 
the legislation should involve precommitment strategies and be flexible 
enough to adapt to changes.  While it is a good idea for environmentalists to 
organize their agenda by putting forth “principles,” these principles will not 
do much good if future legislation is unable to withstand the passage of time. 
As far as content is concerned, future climate legislation should include 
international incentives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, insulate some 
of the effects of passing additional regulation from the private sector, and 
build on existing regulation. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Although many states have made significant efforts towards climate 
change mitigation and adaptation, it is unlikely that states can make much of 
a difference on the global scale.  Furthermore, there exists no mechanism at 
the international level to implement changes.  The most efficient way to make 
major policy changes is at the federal level, yet there are several major 
problems with enacting lasting climate change legislation; the longer we 
delay addressing climate change, the more difficult it will be to address the 
problem in the future.  Obviously, this problem can be overcome by acting 
immediately. 
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Climate change legislation is opposed by corporations (with notable 
exceptions, such as the U.S. Climate Action Partnership), which have a great 
deal of financial resources and political influence.  Perhaps the easiest way 
to spur corporations to join with environmentalists in order to pass additional 
climate change legislation is for states to pass inconsistent regulation. 
Passing inconsistent regulations create market uncertainty, thereby 
incentivizing corporations to pass “ceiling” regulations in order to preempt 
arbitrary environmental standards. 
However, even if environmentalists are able to pass federal climate 
change legislation, then it must be both effective and lasting.  Perhaps the 
best way to accomplish this is to include precommitment strategies and make 
the legislation flexible enough to withstand political change.  Any additional 
climate change regulations should likely include incentives for the 
intentional community to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, build on existing 
federal and state legislation, and insulate the private sector against some of 
the effects of passing sweeping environmental legislation.  Assuming that 
Congress is unable to pass climate change legislation in the immediate future, 
environmentalists should know ways to pass effective and lasting legislation 
for the next legislative “moment.” 
